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Abstract—Low rate attacks, or Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks of
the occasional misbehaviour, can throttle the throughput of
robust timed-protocols, like the
Transmission Control
Protocol(TCP), by creating either periodic or exponentially
distributed outages, or transmission disruptions. Such attacks
are as effective as full-fledged DoS with high undetectability of
the misbehaving network entity. In this paper, we present a
mathematical model of Low-Rate.
randomly occurring,
Denial-of-Service attacks. By viewing the process as a twostate Continuous-Time Markov Chain(CTMC), we have
successfully computed the transition and state probabilities of a
compromised network entity that can behave normally, while
in the normal state. and abnormally, when in the abnormal state.

application server queue. These attacks, however, utilise a
compromised network entity’s ability to predict a vacancy
in the application server, while the attacks mentioned in [1]
exploit the retransmission characteristics of the
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP).
Our work, however, is protocol-independent and
takes into consideration a very general pattern of
compromised-entity- behaviour that could be applied to a
variety of situatiions. The conditions that must be met for
a server to be a potential target has been discussed in [5].
Finally, the methods and means of detecting Low-Rate
Attacks have been discussed in [1], [2], [3], [5].
In this paper, we address the question of modelling LowRate DoS attacks with randomly occurring outages. The
paper is organised as follows: Section 2 gives an intuitive
introduc- tion to compromised-network-entity misbehaviour
character- istics when mounting such attacks, while Section
3 contains a rigorous mathematical treatment of the subject.
We present our conclusions in Section 4.

Key words: Low-rate Denial of Service Attacks, Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP), stochastic processes, randomly-occurring
outages, exponential distribution, Continuous Time Markov
Chains.

I. INTRODUCTION
Denial-of-Service attacks, traditionally known as a
benign network attack, can be twice as detrimental to
transmissions by depleting resources for legitimate users
and, from the time gained by the disruption, expediting
the correlation of the communicating parties’ identities
with the packets received, thus endangering the privacy of
the sender and the receiver of the message. While simple
Denial-of-Service attacks involve bringing down the entire
network in one blow through a compromised network entity,
like a router, more evolved network attacks mandate the
compromised entity to misbehave only at certain intervals
of time while behaving normally the rest of the time. The
idea has been dealt with extensively in [1], deeming these
attacks Low-Rate Denial of Service attacks. These attacks
can either be mounted by creating periodic or
exponentially distributed outages. While [1] contains a
thorough survey of such attacks through periodic outages,
little has been done to model Low-Rate attacks through
randomly occurring, or exponentially distributed, traffic
disruptions.

II. THE PRELIMINARIES
In Low-Rate Denial of Service Attacks, a
compromised network entity creates transmission
blackouts, referred to as
‘outages’, in which it overwhelms the target system
with packets, thus denying network resources to legitimate
users. These outages are created at specific time epochs, a
statistics- term for time instants. The time intervals between
consecutive outages, which is the time when the
compromised entity behaves normally, can either be periodic
or exponentially distributed, in which case, it becomes a
random process. Fig.
1 illustrates the idea. The genesis of such attacks
lies in [1], where low-rate attacks with periodic outages
are modelled and investigated in terms of their effect on
the throughput of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
and how its various flavours respond to these attacks,
which exploit the Retrans- mission Time Out(RTO)

The idea of a mathematical model of Low-Rate Denial
of Service Attacks has been discussed in [4], [1] alongwith
its effects on the overhead and the client-success
probability, or the probability of finding a vacant slot in an
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characteristic of TCP protocols. By creating outages of
duration of the Round-Trip-Time(RTT) of packets after
minRTO (minimum Retransmission Time Out) units of time,
the throughput of a robust protocol like the TCP can be
throttled.
In this paper, we have attempted to model low-rate
attacks with randomly-occurring outages. Assuming that a
misbehav- ing network entity has two states, the normal
and the abnormal states, and that normal and abnormal
behaviour on the system’s part is the outcome of the system
being in these states, we view the alternation between the
normal and abnormal states as a stochastic process. Since
normal behaviour, lasting for the time

Fig. 1: (a) Low-rate attacks with periodically occurring outages. (b) Low-rate attacks with randomly occurring outages.

would imply that the time spent by the router in the normal
state is greater than the time spent in the abnormal state.
Thus, the time spent in a particular state u is of vital
importance. In the next section, a more rigorous
mathematical treatment of the ideas, discussed in this
section, leading to the computation of the probabilities of
the system being in the normal and abnormal states.

between consecutive outages, is the outcome of the time
spent in the normal state, we arrive at the following
conclusions
Time interval between consecutive outages = Time spent
in the normal state
Duration of an outage = Time spent in the abnormal state
Hence, the conditional probability of the system being in
state, say u, at time epoch (t + s), given that the system is
in state u at time epoch t, is then the same as the probability
of the system spending s or more units of time in state u
starting from time epoch t. Since this duration is random,
and hence statisfying the Markovian property of
memorylessness, the aforementioned conditional
probability distribution is an exponential one. These ideas
are discussed more rigorously in the next section.
Intuitively, undetectability demands the probability of a
misbehaving router assuming the abnormal state to be less
than the router assuming the normal state. Hence, the
chances of the router being in the normal state are greater
than it being in the abnormal state. On a time scale, this

III. THE MODEL
Let the state space of a misbehaving router, S, be given by
S = {N,A}
where N refers to the normal state of a misbehaving router
and A denotes the abnormal state of a router.
For any general state space comprising states u and v, let
Ut be a random variable denoting the time spent in state u
starting from, and Xt be another random variable denoting
the state at, epoch t. Then
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(Ut e” s) a”(Xt’ = u, t d” t’ d” (t + s))a”(Xt+s = u, Xt = u) (1)
Ò! P (Ut e” s) = P (Xt+s = u, = u) (2)
Ò! P (Ut e” s) = P (Xt+s = u | Xt = u)P (Xt = u) (3)

The reason for the chosen co-domain will soon be clear. Also,
note that

Let us look at (1). The random variable Ut is a continuous
random variable and so P(Ut = s) = 0. Therefore, it must be
where ë refers to the expected holding time of state u.
the case that either P(Ut d” s) or P(Ut e” s). Since we are
Substituting (6) in (5), we have
concerned with finding the probability that a compromised
router would spend a time interval of s units in state u (that
is to say, starting from time epoch t, the system would be in
state u at epoch (t + s)), and since P(Ut = s) = 0, Ut being a
continuous random variable, the only way we can be sure
that the system would indeed spend a time of s units in the
In a two-state system, with the states being u and v, we
state u is by assuming P(Ut e” s). In other words, the
can say that
minimum amount of time spent in state u would be s units
of time. The assumption that P(Ut d” s) would mean that the
maximum amount of time spent in state u is s units of time,
but we cannot be sure that starting at epoch t, the system
From (9), we have
would definitely be in state u at epoch (t + s) since a state
transition could occur much earlier than time epoch (t + s).
Bearing this in mind, the right-hand-side of (1) would have
Now, we wish to determine the state matrix, ð(t), containing
to be written as P(Xt’ = u; t d” t’ d” (t + s)). Of course, the
the probabilities of the system being in states u and v at
actual time epoch, starting from time epoch t, at which the
time epoch t. We know that
transition takes place, could be greater than (t+s), but, s
being the minimum amount of time spent in state u (from
the left-hand-side of (1)), we can be sure that the system ∈
∀
would be in state u at time epoch (t + s). This gives us (1) in
where ð(0) is the state matrix of the system at epoch t = 0
its stated form.
From the definition, it is clear that the system is in state u
at epoch t and thus
P (Xt = u) = 1
(4)
Substituting (4) in (3), we get
P (Ut s) = P (Xt+s = u | Xt = u) (5)

and Q is defined thus
where |S| refers to the number of states the system can
assume. Ours is a two state system and thus |S| = 2.

The equation above tells us that Ut and Xt+s = u given
that Xt = u are identically distributed. While there is no
restriction on the probability of the random variable Ut , the
most general case, in the context of modelling
misbehaviour, is that of Ut (the time spent in state u
starting from epoch t) being a random process and thus
Markovian(memoryless). Since Ut is a continuous random
variable constituting a Markovian process and since the
exponential distribution is the only probability distribution
satisfying the Markovian property, we have

From (11) and (13) we have

Since quv [0, 1] u, vS, we have the constraint that
á (u) [0, 1] u S and thus the co-domain in the definition of á
in (7). Since

we have the constraint that the expected holding time for any
state should be greater than or equal to 1 viz. ë e” 1 ∀ u
S. The units of measurement of the average holding times of
each state vary from each other as we shall see later in this

where á(u) is a function associating with state u the expected
number of times the system is in state u per unit time.
Mathematically,
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document. We notice from (14) that the greater the expected
holding time of a particular state u, the lower the probability of
the system making a transition to state v.
Expressing the results in (14) and (15) for our statespace as a
matrix, we have

We assume that a misbehaving router at epoch t = 0 is always
in the normal state. Hence,

From (12), (17) and (18) we have

where ë = 1/á(N) and ë’ = 1/á(A). Now, the units of
measurement of _ and _0 are of vital importance. The following
table shows the default timeout values for the TCP and SCTP
protocols for the Windows and Linux operating systems. As
is obvious from the table above, the Timeout

We have thus computed the probabilities of the system being
in each and every state in its statespace. To verify these
probabilities, we use the Weak Law of Large Numbers [6], [7].
From (19), we have that

value is of the order of seconds as opposed to milliseconds.
According to [1], the optimal time to be spent in the normal
state is of the order of the minimum retransmission timeout
value of the TCP protocol, and thus is to be measured in
seconds, while the holding time of the abnormal state is to be
of the order of the RTT value maintained by the protocol,
which is usually in milliseconds. Since the minimum holding
times of ë and ë’ are 1000ms and 1ms respectively, the average
holding times would have to be greater these values. This is in
total agreement with our values. Thus
Since our conceptualisation requires the expected duration of

Taking limit t

→ “, we have that,

Equations (20) and (21) tell us that, for very large t and for
one average normal-abnormal-state cycle duration lasting for
(ë + ë’) milliseconds, the system tends to spend average
times ë and ë’ in the normal and the abnormal states
respectively. Comparing this to the number of heads in a
sequence of coin flips, we note that, for a very large number of
coin flips, the probability of getting a head tends to 1/2, the
average value. The same idea applies to our case, thereby
verifying our probabilities.

normal behaviour to exceed that of abnormal behaviour, we
have ë > ë’.
Given Q, eQte-t computes to

IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

In this paper we have determined the probabilities of a
compromised system, mounting Low-Rate DoS attacks,
behaving both normally and abnormally. So, this work, in a
way, is an extension of the work in [1]. We intend to use these
probabilities to primarily detect and forestall attacks of this
kind either through Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) or
Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) with the design of more robust
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protocols exhibiting immunity to attacks of this nature being
the secondary motive.
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